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DD/S&T 224-72

31 JUL 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR:

We have reviewed your draft memorandum concerning the improvement of US understanding of the Soviet military R&D effort and we do have some substantive comments and as you will see some disagreements with you on the matter. Let me take these up in two parts.

First, you have focused on NIE 11-12-72 as a basis for coming to some of the conclusions you have drawn. However, it seems to us that one must look at a broader range of publications to make such an assessment, particularly in view of the fact that NIE 11-12 was consciously limited in scope so as not to duplicate NIE 11-2, 11-3 or 11-8. It may also be less clear or descriptive than one would like it to be from a strictly editorial point of view. As is stated in the Terms of Reference and in the Introduction, NIE 11-12 was intended to cover a narrow range of problems stemming from the costing estimates put out by DDR&E; it was never to explore all aspects of our knowledge of Soviet military R&D. Partly for this reason, but primarily because it was time to have a more complete community review, the SIC early this year decided to proceed with an update of its January 1967 study on the scope and direction of Soviet military R&D. This study is well on its way to completion. In light of this, I do not think we should base any conclusions about the state of our knowledge or the capability of our analytical resources on the content of NIE 11-12. If there are some conclusions to be drawn, it would seem desirable to wait at least until the SIC study becomes available and base any conclusions on a review of it, NIE 11-12, 11-8 and 11-3.

Second, even after we see the SIC report, there is no doubt in my mind that it will be evident that there are many things about the Soviet military research and development program that we do not understand. Even then, however, it will not be clear that this means that we need to increase our analytical or collection resources against the problem, or that we need to organize in some different way to attack it. Indeed, it may be that our lack of understanding is the result of inadequate data which we do not have the technical know-how to collect, or which are not normally subject to clandestine

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collection. With regard to your conclusion that "nowhere in the US intelligence organizations is there a specific group of analysts with the required interdisciplinary skills dedicated to integrating our intelligence and estimative experience in an overall attack on the Soviet military R&D problem," it is our organizational intent here that this particular task is inherent in the OSI and FMSAC missions; indeed, it is the primary purpose of these organizations to perform just the job that you have described. Of course, it is possible that this capability can be improved and that there are data collection capabilities which we have not discovered which should be exploited. Before you come to that conclusion, however, let me invite you to spend some time with Don Chamberlain, Dave Brandwein and their people to get a feel for the scope of our activities, the people we have involved, the data that we think we need, and the collection capabilities that are available.

In general, then, for reasons inherent in the discussion above, I do not believe we should establish the task force you suggest at this time.

Donald H. Steininger
Assistant Deputy Director
for
Science and Technology

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20 July 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Intelligence
Deputy Director for Science & Technology
Director of National Estimates

SUBJECT: Improving U.S. Understanding of Soviet
Military R&D

1. Reference is the attached draft memorandum for the DCI, subject as above. This memorandum has been discussed with Mr. Tweedy who has deferred judgment on sending it forward to the DCI pending your comments on the proposal.

2. Early receipt of such comments would be appreciated.

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Chief, PRG/IC

Attachment:
Draft memo as stated

EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE
OF E. O. 11652, E. O. 11652, E. O. 11652
EX(1), (2), (3) or (4) (circle one or more)

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Approved For Release 2004/03/11 : CIA-RDP75B00514R000100220008-4

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: Improving U.S. Understanding of Soviet
Military R&D

1. The basic premise of this memorandum is that there is need for an increase in the U.S. intelligence effort devoted to acquiring an understanding of the Soviet military research and development program. The draft NIE 11-12-72, "Soviet Military Research and Development," 27 June 1972, clearly indicates the inadequacies of our knowledge of present and probably future Soviet military R&D. Considering the importance of R&D in the weapons field to future U.S. security and policy interests, an improved analytic and perhaps collection effort appears to be needed.
2. The draft NIE, for instance, notes on page 27 that:

"They (the Soviets) have never deployed a weapon system which took full advantage of what we estimated was the state-of-the-art in their technology at the time the weapon system was developed."
3. Questions immediately arise as to the correctness of our estimates of their "state-of-the-art" and, more importantly, as to Soviet R&D practice and philosophy and the economic, institutional and cultural variables to which the R&D program may be sensitive.
4. In view of the key impact which Soviet military R&D can have on the future security of the United States, it is imperative that this country have as clear an understanding of the Soviet program as is possible. At present, however, nowhere in the U.S. intelligence organizations is there a specific group of analysts with the required interdisciplinary skills dedicated to integrating our intelligence and estimative experience in an overall attack on the Soviet military R&D problem. Inputs for such papers as NIE 11-12-72 come from a variety of production offices working on different aspects of the problem.
5. The end result is far from a sophisticated, coherent evaluation of the nature of Soviet military R&D, the patterns of institutional behavior involved, and the political and economic factors which importantly affect R&D decisions. Such an evaluation is essential, however, if the directions in which Soviet R&D is headed are to be identified and the resultant weapon systems anticipated.

EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE
OF E.O. 13526, E.O. 13526, E.O. 13526
EX(1), (2), (3) or (4) (circle one or more)

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6. It is recognized that much of the necessary raw information is not available and one of the tasks is to investigate whether there may not be ways to acquire more of the information that is needed. Considering the intimate relationship between our understanding of Soviet military R&D and the effectiveness of the SALT arrangements, provision of additional resources to attack this problem may be warranted.
7. I propose that a task force be established under the aegis of the DD/S&T or the DD/I to:
 - a. Determine the extent to which manpower and other resources currently are being devoted to analysis and production on the Soviet military R&D problem throughout the intelligence community.
 - b. Assess the adequacy of this effort in terms of accomplishment of needed tasks.
 - c. Identify any subject areas in which additional collection action is needed.
 - d. Weigh the advantages of the establishment of a special full-time, interdisciplinary research unit to be responsible for integrating all U.S. knowledge of Soviet military R&D activities and developing such analytical techniques and approaches as are needed for projection of likely future Soviet programs in the military R&D field.
 - e. Providing such a special research unit is considered necessary, recommend its community-wide composition and organizational location.
8. It is suggested you approve the foregoing and set a 1 November deadline for completion of the task force report.

Bronson Tweedy
D/DCI/IC